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Abstract — The necessity of end-user engagement in power 
systems have become a reality in recent times. One of the solutions 
to this engagement is the creation of local energy markets. The 
distribution systems operators are compelled to investigate and 
optimize their asset investment cost in reinforcement of grids by 
introducing smart grid functionalities in order to avoid 
investments. The congestion management is the one of the most 
promising strategies to deal with the network issues. This paper 
presents a local electricity market or flexibility negotiation as a 
strategy in order to help the distribution system operator in 
congestion management. The local market is performed 
considering an asymmetric action model and is coordinated by an 
aggregator. A case study is presented considering a simulation 
that uses a low voltage network with 17 buses, which includes 9 
consumers and 3 prosumers, all domestic users. Results show that 
using the proposed market model, the network congestion is 
avoided by taking advantage from the trading of consumers 
flexibility. 
Index Terms—Aggregator, DSO, Flexibility, Local Electricity 
Market. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The future of power systems is being redesigned into a 
system where consumers (end users) are considered to be the 
central entity in the system. This vision is present in the 
Strategic Energy Technology (SET) plan of the European 
Union [1]. This transformation of end-user’s roles essentially 
frames these as entities that have an active contribution in 
electric power systems. Aggregators enable end-users to be 
actively involved in the electrical system, namely in the 
(indirect) participation in electricity markets (wholesale), 
where they could sell surplus production from local generated 
renewable energy sources (RES). The widespread of RES 
allowed the mass appearance of distributed production (solar 
and wind). The large-scale penetration of distributed, 
renewable energy has brought new difficulties and challenges 
to the electrical system, namely due to their variability, which 
makes production forecasting a difficult task.  
Energy storage systems (ESS) are presented as a solution to 
mitigate the intermittency of RES [2]. Demand response (DR) 
is also a solution to deal with the RES problem, since it allows 
to cut, reduce or shift loads, adapting the consumption to 
variable generation [3]. DR and ESS are two concepts that 
apply in real environments enabling flexibility. Flexibility is a 
mechanism that until now has been used by the transmission 
system operator (TSO), its function is to adapt the consumption 
in a certain local to the needs of the electricity network [4]. 
Recently, with the inclusion of the RESs, the distribution 
system operators (DSO) have the need to obtain flexibility in 
the distribution networks. This flexibility has been achieved 
using an intermediary, the aggregators. Thus, aggregators 
provide services that allow the DSO to obtain flexibility from 
the final consumers [5].  
This paper presents a different way for DSO to achieve 
flexibility through a competitive local energy market (LEM). In 
this LEM, the goal is for the DSO to achieve the required 
flexibility through a local trading process where market 
participants are the final consumers. In this sense, when the 
DSO detects that the need for flexibility in the network, the 
need is communicated to a local market operator (LMO) (e.g., 
aggregator). This LMO will encourage the exchange of 
electricity and flexibility (consumption reduction, increase or 
shift) between end-consumers. The price of electricity in the 
local market will be defined between the DSO and the LMO 
according to the offers placed in the market by the participants. 
Results show that this price is more advantageous for end-
users than the one that is practiced in the retail market, in both 
sales and purchase actions. Advantages are also shown for the 
DSO, which will be interested in this type of actions, because 
in case of problems in the network (congestion) if the end-users 
do not receive the electricity service, they will have to be 
compensated by the DSO. 
After this introductory section, section II presents the 
business model that support the proposed local market model. 
Section III introduces the proposed methodology, and section 
IV presents the case study validates the proposed model. 
Finally, section V presents the conclusions of the work. 
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II. BUSSINESS MODEL 
The presented business model has been developed under the 
DOMINOES Project [6] and is created based on a three level 
business model, which is described as follows [7]. 
First level: Strategic level – The Provider: the aggregator 
is considered as a service provider. The strategy model: its 
strategy is deploying flexibility services to the DSO to solve or 
mitigate congestion management. The flexibility is obtained 
from its aggregated resources, the consumers, producers and 
prosumers. All end-users of the network may belong to the 
aggregators of the aggregator, they will only have to be able to 
provide the flexibility when the aggregator requires it. The 
resources model: the aggregator will have in its possession a 
platform for flexibility transaction that will allow the 
aggregates to send their proposals. Ensuring additional means 
to enhance the offered service (e.g., load and generation 
forecasting, consumption and generation profiling), which can 
be ensured by internal services or be contracted with external 
entities. The network model: the aggregator can have external 
contracts with resources to deploy flexibility in order to 
overcome the unavailability of end users. 
Second level: Customer and Market level – The costumer 
model: the service is deployed to help the DSO solving 
congestion situations. It is assumed that the DSO performs a 
technical validation about grid status, identifying the situations 
in which flexibility might be procured to avoid congestion 
issues. The market offer model: Aggregator offer a new service 
to help the DSO solving congestions situations. Competitors 
can be producers, consumers and prosumers with direct 
contracts with the DSO (namely large dimension players). The 
revenue model: The aggregator acts as an intermediary between 
the DSO and the aggregated resources. The price per unit of 
deployed flexibility can result from an asymmetric pool model.  
For that, the aggregator makes a call auction to its aggregated 
resources, which will present their bids. The asymmetric pool 
model will be applied, where all the accepted bids, required to 
meet the flexibility amount required by the DSO, are paid at the 
clearing price (equal to the most expensive accepted bid). 
Third level: Value Chain level – The delivered model: the 
deployed flexibility is delivered to the distribution system in 
reply to the DSO request, materialized as a reduction or an 
increase of the load. The procurement model: the aggregated 
resources contribute to the committed load reduction. The 
Financial model: the Aggregator may obtain the required 
capital to put the business model in place by bank credit. The 
sell/provisioned of flexibility must return a sufficient income to 
cover the payment of such bank credit. 
III. METHODOLOGY  
This section presents the methodology applied in this paper. 
As already mentioned, the methodology is created to solve 
problems in the network, is this case the congestion 
management strategy is used. This strategy can be defined by a 
service to reduce peak loads in order to avoid thermal overload 
of system components. Different from a grid reinforcement 
project, the thermal overload of the system may cause a failure 
in the short-term horizon so that congestion management 
requires a swift response from the DSO. Therefore, demand 
response and flexibility services may find value for the DSO to 
defer (or in some cases even avoid) grid investments [8]. 
Fig. 1 presents the simulation process implemented in this 
work. The process star with the load of the data. The forecast 
data is performed for the next 24 hours, it is realized 
considering the historical data. After obtained the forecast 
values the DSO perform the validation of the network using the 
power flow analyses. The DSO checks the limits of the network 
components. If in some period any component is overloaded the 
DSO determine the quantity of energy for reduce. This 
information is reported to the aggregator, and the local market 
can starter. In the Local Market the Aggregator will have the 
functions of market operator. After the market process is 
successful, the Aggregator will report the information to the 
DSO so that it can validate the new dispatch. The DSO will 
check the network state preforming a new power flow with the 
update values. 
 
Fig. 1 – Simulation process  
The total apparent power at certain point, in this case 𝑥 in 
the network at a certain time can give by equation (1). 
𝑆𝑥,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1






Where, 𝑆𝑥,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  is the total apparent power at point 𝑥, 𝑆𝑖 is 
the total apparent power in bus 𝑖, 𝑖 and 𝑘 represent bus in the 
network, 𝑁 correspond to the number of the buses, 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑘 
correspond to the losses line of bus 𝑖 to 𝑘. In equation (2) and 
(3) represent the apparent power. 
𝑆𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑗𝑄𝑖  (2) 
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where 𝑃𝑖  corresponds to the active power of bus 𝑖 and 𝑄𝑖  
correspond to the reactive power in bus 𝑖. The term |𝑉𝑖| and |𝑉𝑘| 
correspond to the absolute value of magnitude voltage in bus 𝑖 
and 𝑘 respectively, 𝜃𝑖,𝑘 correspond to the difference of bus 𝑖 
and 𝑘 angles, 𝐺 correspond to the conductance matrix and 𝐵 is 
the susceptance matrix. Equation (4) presents the losses 
calculation. 
𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑘 = 𝐼𝑖,𝑘
2 × 𝑍𝑖,𝑘 (4) 
The term 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 corresponds to the current in line of bus 𝑖 to 𝑘 
and 𝑍𝑖,𝑘 corresponds to the line impedance of bus 𝑖 to 𝑘. In 
equation (5) is present the lines impedance formula. 
𝑍𝑖,𝑘 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑘 + 𝑗𝑄𝑖,𝑘 (5) 
The term 𝑅𝑖,𝑘corresponds to the line resistance of bus 𝑖 to 𝑘 
and 𝑗𝑄𝑖,𝑘 corresponds to the line reactance of bus 𝑖 to 𝑘. The 
line characteristic values are presented in Table 1. 
In this study and considering the network present in Fig. 3 
if congestion occurs the condition present in equation needs to 
be verified.  
𝑆1,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 >  𝑆1,𝑚𝑎𝑥 (6) 
As one can observe in Fig. 3 the transformer is present 
between bus 1 to 3 and the apparent power in bus 1 correspond 
to the apparent power requested to the transformer. As equation 
(6) shows, when 𝑆1,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is greater than 𝑆1,𝑚𝑎𝑥  is considered that 
the congestion exists. 
In case the congestions occurs as mentioned in the business 
model section, the DSO requests to Aggregator to try to reduce 
the power of the loads. The Aggregator can active the local 
market and all end users present in the network can participate. 
In this case, the bids of power reduction are considered as end 
users’ participation. In this case the bid is created are randomly 
created. The equitation (7) presented the amount bid creation.  
𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑(0,1) × 0.3 × 𝑆𝑖 (7) 
where 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑(0,1) represents a random number with uniformly 
distribution between 0 and 1. Tthe 0.3 × 𝑆𝑖  means that the 
power amount for reduce can only reach 30% of the apparent 
power of bus 𝑖. The equation (8) presents the price bid creation. 
𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
= max(0 , 0.105 + 0.05 ∗ 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑛) (8) 
where the 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 is the maximum between 0 and a random 
number created with a normally distribution with mean 0.105 
and standard deviation of 0.05. The mean value of 0.105 is 
chosen considering the price of energy salles for consumers 
connect to the low voltage network in Portugal [9]. With this 
rule, it is ensured that the price calculation is always greater 
than or equal to 0. In Fig. 2 is presented the normal distribution 
representation used in this work. 
 
Fig. 2 – Normal distribution  
In Fig. 2 the shadow area represents the possible values for 
price bids. As can see by the Fig. 2 the price there is a high 
probability that the price value will be close to the average. Is 
considered that there is a 1.8% of probability that the price will 
be 0, since all values less than 0 go to 0. The equation (9) 




where 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖 is considered the bid for bus 𝑖, but only bus with 
end consumers connect are able for propose bids. The bid is 
composed by an amount value and a price value. 
As already described in the business model section, the 
implemented local market is created with an asymmetric action 
model. Considering the characteristics of this model, is 
necessary that there is a request from the buyer and bids form 
the sellers. In this case the buyer is the Aggregator and the 
sellers is the (end-users) consumers. The Aggregator request is 
given by the equation (10). 
𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝑆1,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 − 𝑆1,𝑚𝑎𝑥 (10) 
where the 𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑  correspond to the Aggregator request in 
kVA. In the asymmetric auction model are accepted the bids 
whose quantity is smaller than the aggregator request. The price 
is determined by the last bid accepted.  
IV. CASE STUDY  
This section is divided into two sub-sections. In the 
specification sub-section is present the case study and the 
scenario for which the proposed methodology is implemented. 
The results sub-section presents the numerical results obtained 
from the application of the methodology to the case study.   
A. Specification 
Fig. 3 shows the low voltage network used in this work to 
perform the simulations. The network is considered to operate 
at a 0.4 kV voltage and is fed by a 15 kV medium voltage line. 
Between buses 1 and 3 is a transformer with a power of 30 kVA 
and with a transformation ratio of 15 / 0.4 kV. The network 
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consists of 17 buses, of which 12 buses (6-17) are connected 
loads of domestic consumers. In the network there is also 
distributed generation installed that is owned by the consumers. 
The sum of the contracted power of all the consumers is of 45 
kVA, thus the transformer is dimensioned for 66% of the 
contracted power. 
 
Fig. 3 – Low voltage network  
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the lines that are part of 
the network shown in the figure Fig. 3. As already indicated, it 
is assumed that the transformer is located between buses 1 and 
3. Bus lines 2 to 3, 3 to 4 and 4 to 5 are lines with 30 meters in 
length and with the same characteristics. the remaining lines 
have different lengths, 15 meters (2 to 6, 3 to 9, 4 to 12 and 5 to 
15), 20 meters (2 to 7, 3 to 10, 4 to 13 and 5 to 16) and 25 meters 
2 to 8, 3 to 11, 4 to 14 and 5 to 17). 










2 3 30 0.0094 0.0103 
3 4 30 0.0094 0.0103 
4 5 30 0.0094 0.0103 
2 6 15 0.0195 0.0031 
2 7 20 0.0260 0.0042 
2 8 25 0.0325 0.0052 
2 9 15 0.0195 0.0031 
3 10 20 0.0260 0.0042 
3 11 25 0.0325 0.0052 
4 12 15 0.0195 0.0031 
4 13 20 0.0260 0.0042 
4 14 25 0.0325 0.0052 
5 15 15 0.0195 0.0031 
5 16 20 0.0260 0.0042 
5 17 25 0.0325 0.0052 
1 3 Transformer - 0.06251 
10.400 kV Base 
In Fig. 4 are present the load profiles aggregated by buses 
in this case the loads of bus 6, 7 and 8 are aggregated in bus 2, 
the loads of bus 9, 10 and 11 are aggregated in bus 3, the loads 
of bus 12, 13 and 14 are aggregated in bus 4 and the loads of 
bus 15, 16 and 17 are aggregated in bus 5. 
 
Fig. 4 – Demand profiles per bus  
The aggregation of loads is only considered to facilitate the 
visualization of the data. As one can see by Fig. 4 the profiles 
are very similar, in the early hours of the morning there is a 
tendency of consumption as well as in the late afternoon hours 
and early evening hours. This last period is where the peak of 
consumption is verified in all points of aggregation. 
B. Results 
In this section the results of proposed methodology are 
presented. Fig. 5 presents the results of the power flow 
simulation and the production of prosumers. The values present 
in Fig. 5 represent the total apparent power in bus 1. 
 
Fig. 5 – Network load and limits 
The red line represents the power flow analyses with 
congestion, and the blue line represents the power flow without 
congestion. By analyzing the red line of Fig. 5 it is possible 
conclude that that are two periods when the transformer (bus 1) 
is overloaded. In the 18th and 20th periods the aggregator needs 
to activate the local market mechanism to avoid the overload in 
Medium Voltage Line (15kV)1
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the transformer. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 are a representation of the 
asymmetric auction for the periods with congestion.  
 
Fig. 6 – Local market results for 18th period  
In Fig. 6 is present the asymmetric auction model for 18th 
period. In  Fig. 6 the requested amount is the result of the 
equation (10), and represent the amount of energy needed for 
avoid the congestion. This value is equal to 5.78 kW and 
considering the result of the market is obtained in the 9th bid. 
The clearing price is 0.151 €/kW, the first 9 bids will be paid at 
the clearing price. The bids that are out of the accepted bids area 
are excluded. In the Fig. 7 is present the asymmetric auction 
model for 20th period. 
 
Fig. 7 – Local market results for 20th period 
Considering the analysis of Fig. 7 the requested amount is 
equal to 3.09 kW,  also with 9 bids. The clearing price in this 
period was 0.139 €/kW. Considering the results of the market 
mechanisms the DSO in the 18th will need to pay 
5.78 𝑘𝑊 × 0.151
€
𝑘𝑊
= 0.87 € for avoid the congestion of the 
network. In the case of 20th period the DSO for avoid the 
congestion need to pay 3.09 𝑘𝑊 × 0.139
€
𝑘𝑊
= 0.43 €.  
Considering the blue line (load without congestion) in Fig. 
5, there is a 30 kVA of maximum values that corresponds to the 
maximum capacity of the transformer. If DSO considers an 
overloading of 10% for transformer (light blue line), the market 
mechanism will be applied only one time (18th period).  
V. CONCLUSION  
This paper has proposed a local market model for 
consumption flexibility trading, as means to complement the 
DSO congestion management by making use of consumers’ 
active participation. 
The proposed methodology shows with the numerical 
results that it is possible to avoid congestion of the network 
using a local market strategy. When congestion occurs, the local 
market for flexibility trading is activated, consumers and 
prosumers submit their bids, which represent their flexibility 
amount and associated price, and the asymmetric auction-based 
market is executed and the needed flexibility amount to avoid 
congestion is achieved. The bids submitted by the market 
players are randomized and have no associated intelligence. As 
future work, players’ intelligent behavior will be studied, in 
order to accommodate strategic bids. It is also intended to test 
this methodology in a case study with more players and 
considering the possibility of the players to have energy storage 
system installed in your facilities.  
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